0000000696 00000 n In game theory, the stag hunt is a game that describes a conflict between safety and social cooperation. If the regime allows for multilateral development, for example, the actors might agree that whoever reaches AI first receives 60% of the benefit, while the other actor receives 40% of the benefit. The second player, or nation in this case, has the same option. As discussed, there are both great benefits and harms to developing AI, and due to the relevance AI development has to national security, it is likely that governments will take over this development (specifically the US and China). Not wanting to miss out on the high geopolitical drama, Moscow invited Afghanistans former president, Hamid Karzai, and a cohort of powerful elitesamong them rivals of the current presidentto sit down with a Taliban delegation last week. This is why international tradenegotiationsare often tense and difficult. The field of international relations has long focused on states as the most important actors in global politics. See Katja Grace, John Salvatier, Allan Dafoe, Baobao Zhang, & Owain Evans, When Will AI Exceed Human Performance? in . The closestapproximationof this in International Relations are universal treaties, like the KyotoProtocolenvironmental treaty. Using their intuition, the remainder of this paper looks at strategy and policy considerations relevant to some game models in the context of the AI Coordination Problem. The matrix above provides one example. As will hold for the following tables, the most preferred outcome is indicated with a 4, and the least preferred outcome is indicated with a 1., Actor As preference order: DC > CC > DD > CD, Actor Bs preference order: CD > CC > DD > DC. Rousseau recognized that the ine cient outcome hunting hare may result, just as conict can result in the security dilemma, and proceeded to provide philosophical arguments in favor of the outcome where both hunters . Two hunters can either jointly hunt a stag (an adult deer and rather large meal) or individually hunt a rabbit (tasty, but substantially less filling). SUBJECT TERMS Game Theory, Brinkmanship, Stag Hunt, Taiwan Strait Issue, Cuban Missile Crisis 16. 0000004572 00000 n For example, Stag Hunts are likely to occur when the perceived harm of developing a harmful AI is significantly greater than the perceived benefit that comes from a beneficial AI. But cooperation is not easy. The game is a prototype of the social contract. Absolute gains will engage in comparative advantage and expand the overall economy while relative . It would be much better for each hunter, acting individually, to give up total autonomy and minimal risk, which brings only the small reward of the hare. . Using game theory as a way of modelingstrategicallymotivated decisions has direct implications for understanding basic international relations issues. To begin exploring this, I now look to the literature on arms control and coordination. While each actors greatest preference is to defect while their opponent cooperates, the prospect of both actors defecting is less desirable then both actors cooperating. @scR^}C$I3v95p6S'34Y1rar{SQ!#fzHBM6 K4m|OOpa7rB'~Y(A|'vh=ziN/quu~6,{Q Discuss. The payoff matrix is displayed as Table 12. The United States is in the hunt, too. The heated debate about the possibility of a U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, prompted by recent negotiations between the U.S. government and the Taliban, has focused understandably on the military value of security assistance. Table 11. As new technological developments bring us closer and closer to ASI[27] and the beneficial returns to AI become more tangible and lucrative, a race-like competition between key players to develop advanced AI will become acute with potentially severe consequences regarding safety. Robert J Aumann, "Nash Equilibria are not Self-Enforcing," in Economic Decision Making: Games, Econometrics and Optimisation (Essays in Honor of Jacques Dreze), edited by J. J. Gabszewicz, J.-F. Richard, and L. Wolsey, Elsevier Science Publishers, Amsterdam, 1990, pp. International Relations Classical Realism- Morganthau- anarchy is assumed as a prominent concern in international relations,with the international Stag Hunt [26] Stephen Hawking, Stuart Russell, Max Tegmark, Frank Wilczek, Transcendence looks at the implications of artificial intelligence but are we taking AI seriously enough? The Indepndent, May 1, 2014, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/stephen-hawking-transcendence-looks-at-the-implications-of-artificial-intelligence-but-are-we-taking-9313474.html. These strategies are not meant to be exhaustive by any means, but hopefully show how the outlined theory might provide practical use and motivate further research and analysis. Together, these elements in the arms control literature suggest that there may be potential for states as untrusting, rational actors existing in a state of international anarchy to coordinate on AI development in order to reduce future potential global harms. So it seems that, while we still are motivated by own self-interest, the addition of social dynamics to the two-person Stag Hunt game leads to a tendency of most people agreeing to hunt the stag. [40] Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 30, 2 (1978): 167-214. 695 20 Overall, the errors overstated the companys net income by 40%. As the infighting continues, the impulse to forego the elusive stag in favor of the rabbits on offer will grow stronger by the day. The stag may not pass every day, but the hunters are reasonably certain that it will come. 201-206. A person's choice to bind himself to a social contract depends entirely on his beliefs whether or not the other person's or people's choice. Moreover, they also argue that pursuing all strategies at once would also be suboptimal (or even impossible due to mutual exclusivity), making it even more important to know what sort of game youre playing before pursuing a strategy[59]. A common example of the Prisoners Dilemma in IR is trade agreements. At the same time, there are great harms and challenges that arise from AIs rapid development. international relations-if the people made international decisions stag hunt, chicken o International relations is a perfect example of an This section defines suggested payoffs variables that impact the theory and simulate the theory for each representative model based on a series of hypothetical scenarios. Outline a basic understanding of what the discipline of International Relations is about, and Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778): Parable of the Stag Hunt. Furthermore, in June 2017, China unveiled a policy strategy document unveiling grand ambitions to become the world leader in AI by 2030. The dilemma is that if one hunter waits, he risks one of his fellows killing the hare for himself, sacrificing everyone else. 0000016501 00000 n might complicate coordination efforts. Table 8. Within these levels of analysis, there are different theories that have could be considered. [2] Tom Simonite, Artificial Intelligence Fuels New Global Arms Race, Wired., September 8, 2017, https://www.wired.com/story/for-superpowers-artificial-intelligence-fuels-new-global-arms-race/. In the stag hunt, two hunters must each decide whether to hunt the stag together or hunt rabbits alone. In these abstractions, we assume two utility-maximizing actors with perfect information about each others preferences and behaviors. If, by contrast, each hunter patiently keeps his or her post, everyone will be rewarded with a lavish feast. In 2016, the Obama Administration developed two reports on the future of AI. [5] They can, for example, work together to improve good corporate governance. Finally, if both sides defect or effectively choose not to enter an AI Coordination Regime, we can expect their payoffs to be expressed as follows: The benefit that each actor can expect to receive from this scenario is solely the probability that they achieve a beneficial AI times each actors perceived benefit of receiving AI (without distributional considerations): P_(b|A) (A)b_Afor Actor A and P_(b|B) (B)b_Bfor Actor B. Next, I outline my theory to better understand the dynamics of the AI Coordination Problem between two opposing international actors. The stag hunt problem originated with philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his Discourse on Inequality. It comes with colossal opportunities, but also threats that are difficult to predict. As a result, there is no conflict between self-interest and mutual benefit, and the dominant strategy of both actors would be to cooperate. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, in contrast, despite the fact that both players cooperating is Pareto efficient, the only pure Nash equilibrium is when both players choose to defect. I introduce the example of the Stag Hunt Gamea short, effective, and easy-to-use activity that simulates Jean-Jacques Rousseau's political philosophy. The stag hunt differs from the prisoner's dilemma in that there are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria:[2] one where both players cooperate, and one where both players defect. As an advocate of structural realism, Gray[45] questions the role of arms control, as he views the balance of power as a self-sufficient and self-perpetuating system of international security that is more preferable. For example, Stag Hunts are likely to occur when the perceived harm of developing a harmful AI is significantly greater than the perceived benefit that comes from a beneficial AI . On the face of it, it seems that the players can then 'agree' to play (c,c); though the agreement is not enforceable, it removes each player's doubt about the other one playing c". If participation is not universal, they cannot surround the stag and it escapes, leaving everyone that hunted stag hungry. Beding (2008), but also in international relations (Jervis 1978) and macroeconomics (Bryant 1994). In Exercises 252525 through 323232, f(x)f(x)f(x) is a probability density function for a particular random variable XXX. endstream endobj 1 0 obj <> endobj 2 0 obj [/PDF/Text] endobj 3 0 obj <> endobj 8 0 obj <> endobj 9 0 obj <>stream [30], Today, government actors have already expressed great interest in AI as a transformative technology. In Just War Theory, what is the doctrine of double effect? Most events in IR are not mutually beneficial, like in the Battle of the Sexes. 0000004367 00000 n In the US, the military and intelligence communities have a long-standing history of supporting transformative technological advancements such as nuclear weapons, aerospace technology, cyber technology and the Internet, and biotechnology. [36] Colin S. Gray, The Arms Race Phenomenon, World Politics, 24, 1(1971): 39-79 at 41. They can cheat on the agreement and hope to gain more than the first nation, but if the both cheat, they both do very poorly. Explain Rousseau's metaphor of the 'stag hunt'. Absolute gains looks at the total effect of the decision while relative gains only looks at the individual gains in respect to others. [3] Elon Musk, Twitter Post, September 4, 2017, https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/904638455761612800. Combining both countries economic and technical ecosystem with government pressures to develop AI, it is reasonable to conceive of an AI race primarily dominated by these two international actors. <>stream (1) the responsibility of the state to protect its own population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and from their incitement; What is the difference between structural and operational conflict prevention? While there is certainly theoretical value in creating a single model that can account for all factors and answer all questions inherent to the AI Coordination Problem, this is likely not tractable or useful to attempt at least with human hands and minds alone. Payoff variables for simulated Stag Hunt, Table 14. 1. In recent times, more doctrinal exceptions to Article 2(4) such as anticipatory self defence (especially after the events of 9/11) and humanitarian intervention. [23] United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Pathways to Banning Fully Autonomous Weapons, United Nations, October 23, 2017, https://www.un.org/disarmament/update/pathways-to-banning-fully-autonomous-weapons/. In a security dilemma, each state cannot trust the other to cooperate. Weiss, Uri, and Joseph Agassi. [56] look at three different types of strategies governments can take to reduce the level of arms competition with a rival: (1) a unilateral strategy where an actors individual actions impact race dynamics (for example, by focusing on shifting to defensive weapons[57]), (2) a tacit bargaining strategy that ties defensive expenditures to those of a rival, and (3) a negotiation strategy composed of formal arms talks. Each can individually choose to hunt a stag or hunt a hare. [13] And impressive victories over humans in chess by AI programs[14] are being dwarfed by AIs ability to compete with and beat humans at exponentially more difficult strategic endeavors like the games of Go[15] and StarCraft. Additionally, both actors can expect a greater return if they both cooperate rather than both defect. [21] Moreover, racist algorithms[22] and lethal autonomous weapons systems[23] force us to grapple with difficult ethical questions as we apply AI to more society realms. Using game theoretical representations of state preferences, Downs et al. If an individual hunts a stag, he must have the cooperation of his partner in order to succeed. [31] Meanwhile, U.S. military and intelligence agencies like the NSA and DARPA continue to fund public AI research. On a separate piece of paper, write the best possible answer for each one. Cultural Identity - crucial fear of social systems. Depending on which model is present, we can get a better sense of the likelihood of cooperation or defection, which can in turn inform research and policy agendas to address this. Despite the damage it could cause, the impulse to go it alone has never been far off, given the profound uncertainties that define the politics of any war-torn country. A great example of chicken in IR is the Cuban Missile Crisis. Such a Coordination Regime could also exist in either a unilateral scenario where one team consisting of representatives from multiple states develops AI together or a multilateral scenario where multiple teams simultaneously develop AI on their own while agreeing to set standards and regulations (and potentially distributive arrangements) in advance. [42] Vally Koubi, Military Technology Races, International Organization 53, 3(1999): 537565. Donna Franks, an accountant for Southern Technologies Corporation, discovers that her supervisor, Elise Silverton, made several errors last year. endstream endobj 12 0 obj <>stream Table 6 Payoff Matrix for AI Coordination Scenarios, Where P_h (A)h [D,D]>P_h (A)h [D,C]>P_h (AB)h [C,C]. Scholars of civil war have argued, for example, that peacekeepers can preserve lasting cease-fires by enabling warring parties to cooperate with the knowledge that their security will be guaranteed by a third party. One example payoff structure that results in a Deadlock is outlined in Table 9. It is the goal this paper to shed some light on these, particularly how the structure of preferences that result from states understandings of the benefits and harms of AI development lead to varying prospects for coordination. <<3B74F05AAAB3B2110A0010B6ACF6FC7F>]/Prev 397494>> In addition to the example suggested by Rousseau, David Hume provides a series of examples that are stag hunts. This section defines suggested payoffs variables that impact the theory and simulate the theory for each representative model based on a series of hypothetical scenarios. Catching the stagthe peace and stability required to keep Afghanistan from becoming a haven for violent extremismwould bring political, economic, and social dividends for all of them. Gray[36] defines an arms race as two or more parties perceiving themselves to be in an adversary relationship, who are increasing or improving their armaments at a rapid rate and structuring their respective military postures with a general attain to the past, current, and anticipated military and political behaviour of the other parties.. To what extent does today's mainstream media provide us with an objective view of war? Both nations can benefit by working together and signing the agreement. The stag is the reason the United States and its NATO allies grew concerned with Afghanistan's internal political affairs in the first place, and they remain invested in preventing networks, such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, from employing Afghan territory as a base. If all the hunters work together, they can kill the stag and all eat. So far, the readings discussed have commented on the unique qualities of technological or qualitative arms races. [31] Executive Office of the President National Science and Technology Council: Committee on Technology, Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence, Executive Office of the President of the United States (October 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC/preparing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf; Artificial Intelligence, Automation, and the Economy Executive Office of the President of the United States (December 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/Artificial-Intelligence-Automation-Economy.PDF. A day passes. 0000006962 00000 n The best response correspondences are pictured here. However, anyone who hunts rabbit can do sosuccessfullyby themselves, but with a smaller meal. Therefore, an agreement to play (c,c) conveys no information about what the players will do, and cannot be considered self-enforcing." [37] Samuel P. Huntington, Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results, Public Policy 8 (1958): 4186. %%EOF 4 thoughts on " The Six-Party Talks as a Game Theoretic 'Stag-Hunt' (2): For example international relations-if the people made international decisions stag hunt, chicken o International relations is a perfect example of an Cooperation under the security dilemma. September 21, 2015 | category: [6], Aumann proposed: "Let us now change the scenario by permitting pre-play communication. What are, according to Kenneth Waltz, the causes of war? War is anarchic, and intervening actors can sometimes help to mitigate the chaos. The academic example is the Stag Hunt. hVN0ii ipv@B\Z7 'Q{6A"@](v`Q(TJ}Px^AYbA`Z&gh'{HoF4 JQb&b`#B$03an8"3V0yFZbwonu#xZ? Read the following questions. In the context of international relations, this model has been used to describe preferences of actors when deciding to enter an arms treaty or not. How does the Just War Tradition position itself in relation to both Realism and Pacifism? The payoff matrix would need adjusting if players who defect against cooperators might be punished for their defection. Individuals, factions and coalitions previously on the same pro-government side have begun to trade accusations with one another. The original stag hunt dilemma is as follows: a group of hunters have tracked a large stag, and found it to follow a certain path. In the stag hunt, what matters is trust Can actors trust that the other will follow through Depends on what they believe about each other, What actors pursue hinges on how likely the other actor is to follow through What is Game Theory theory of looking strategic interaction . This democratic peace proposition not only challenges the validity of other political systems (i.e., fascism, communism, authoritarianism, totalitarianism), but also the prevailing realist account of international relations, which emphasises balance-of-power calculations and common strategic interests in order to explain the peace and stability that characterises relations between liberal democracies. PxF`4f$CN*}S -'2Y72Dl0%^JOG?Y,XT@ dF6l]+$.~Qrjj}46.#Z x^iyY2)/c lLU[q#r)^X [6] Moreover, speculative accounts of competition and arms races have begun to increase in prominence[7], while state actors have begun to take steps that seem to support this assessment. You note that the temptation to cheat creates tension between the two trading nations, but you could phrase this much more strongly: theoretically, both players SHOULD cheat. I will apply them to IR and give an example for each. xref From that moment on, the tenuous bonds keeping together the larger band of weary, untrusting hunters will break and the stag will be lost. In this article, we employ a class of symmetric, ordinal 2 2 games including the frequently studied Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken, and Stag Hunt to model the stability of the social contract in the face of catastrophic changes in social relations. The Stag Hunt 2,589 views Aug 6, 2020 A brief introduction to the stag hunt game in international relations. Hume's second example involves two neighbors wishing to drain a meadow. The second technology revolution caused World War II. The area of international relations theory that is most characterized by overt metaphorical imagery is that of game theory.Although the imagery of game theory would suggest that the games were outgrowths of metaphorical thinking, the origins of game theory actually are to be found in the area of mathematics. This equilibrium depends on the payoffs, but the risk dominance condition places a bound on the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Type of game model and prospect of coordination. Continuous coordination through negotiation in a Prisoners Dilemma is somewhat promising, although a cooperating actor runs the risk of a rival defecting if there is not an effective way to ensure and enforce cooperation in an AI Cooperation Regime. 0000016685 00000 n Hunting stags is quite challenging and requires mutual cooperation. The game is a prototype of the social contract. [41] AI, being a dual-use technology, does not lend itself to unambiguously defensive (or otherwise benign) investments. Throughout history, armed force has been a ubiquitous characteristic of the relations between independent polities, be they tribes, cities, nation-states or empires. December 5, 2010 at 2:49 pm. Deadlock is a common if little studied occurrence in international relations, although knowledge about how deadlocks are solved can be of practical and theoretical importance. Uncategorized, Mail (will not be published) One final strategy that a safety-maximizing actor can employ in order to maximize chances for cooperation is to change the type of game that exists by using strategies or policies to affect the payoff variables in play. Solving this problem requires more understanding of its dynamics and strategic implications before hacking at it with policy solutions. Whereas the short-term impact of AI depends on who controls it, the long-term impact depends now whether it can be controlled at all.[26]. To what extent are today's so-called 'new wars' (Mary Kaldor) post Clausewitzean in nature? However, in Deadlock, the prospect of both actors defecting is more desirable than both actors cooperating. Every country operates selfishly in the international order. [11] In our everyday lives, we store AI technology as voice assistants in our pockets[12] and as vehicle controllers in our garages. The familiar Prisoners Dilemma is a model that involves two actors who must decide whether to cooperate in an agreement or not. I discuss in this final section the relevant policy and strategic implications this theory has on achieving international AI coordination, and assess the strengths and limitations of the theory outlined above in practice. [6] See infra at Section 2.2 Relevant Actors. [16], On one hand, these developments outline a bright future. . Furthermore, a unilateral strategy could be employed under a Prisoners Dilemma in order to effect cooperation. The prototypical example of a PGG is captured by the so-called NPD. HV6am`vjyJ%K>{:kK$C$$EedI3OilJZT$h_'eN. c Although most authors focus on the prisoner's dilemma as the game that best represents the problem of social cooperation, some authors believe that the stag hunt represents an equally (or more) interesting context in which to study cooperation and its problems (for an overview see Skyrms 2004). Actor As preference order: DC > CC > CD > DD, Actor Bs preference order: CD > CC > DC > DD. 0000003265 00000 n Read about me, or email me. What is the so-called 'holy trinity' of peacekeeping? 0000002169 00000 n 15. In this book, you will make an introduction to realism, liberalism and economic structuralism as major traditions in the field, their historical evolution and some theories they have given birth . Is human security a useful approach to security? (Pergamon Press: 1985). 0000000016 00000 n }}F:,EdSr NUMBER OF PAGES 65 14. This situation is often seen as a useful analogy for many kinds of social cooperation, such as international agreements on climate change.[1]. First, I survey the relevant background of AI development and coordination by summarizing the literature on the expected benefits and harms from developing AI and what actors are relevant in an international safety context. One nation can then cheat on the agreement, and receives more of a benefit at the cost of the other. f(x)={332(4xx2)if0x40otherwisef(x)= \begin{cases}\frac{3}{32}\left(4 x-x^2\right) & \text { if } 0 \leq x \leq 4 \\ 0 & \text { otherwise }\end{cases} Gardner's vision, the removal of inferior, Christina Dejong, Christopher E. Smith, George F Cole. An hour goes by, with no sign of the stag. As a result, it is conceivable that international actors might agree to certain limitations or cooperative regimes to reduce insecurity and stabilize the balance of power. The 18th century political philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau famously described a dilemma that arises when a group of hunters sets out in search of a stag: To catch the prized male deer, they must cooperate, waiting quietly in the woods for its arrival. Name four key thinkers of the theory of non-violent resistance, Gandhi, martin luther king, malcon X, cesar chavex. [43] Edward Moore Geist, Its already too late to stop the AI arms race We must manage it instead, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 72, 5(2016): 318321. In order to assess the likelihood of such a Coordination Regimes success, one would have to take into account the two actors expected payoffs from cooperating or defecting from the regime.